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Introduction
The improvement of outcomes has always been important 
for surgeons. This aim has been supported by the evolution 
of science in different fields, from medicine to technology. 
The majority of successes have been achieved working 
under the assumption that good surgical outcomes are 
mainly a result of technical skills. This model, although 
correct, is not exhaustive and has left out a number of 
variables that affect outcomes, of which a number can be 
grouped under the label of non-technical skills, which is a 
subset of human factors.
Human factors “is the scientific discipline concerned with 
the understanding of interactions among humans and other 
elements of a system, and the profession that applies theory, 
principles, data and methods to design in order to optimize 
human well-being and overall system performance., the 
human performance” (IEA Definition) (1).
Non-technical skills are developed to facilitate a shared 
mental model between team members, teams and their 
operational environment. They include situation awareness, 
decision-making, communication, teamwork, leadership 
and performance-shaping factors. The importance of 
these non-technical skills has been highlighted during 
the investigations of serious accidents in many high-risk 
industries like aviation, nuclear and oil & gas, highlighting 
their contribution to error detection, trapping and 
mitigation.
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The investment in technical skills in terms of time and 
financial resources has delivered an improvement in surgical 
outcomes. There is a risk that the investment in this area 
will reduce its return as the nature of surgical interventions 
has moved away from relatively simple, linear activities to 
more complicated and complex procedures. Therefore there 
is a need to create a shared mental model in this uncertain, 
complex and ambiguous environment.
There is an almost untapped opportunity to improve 
outcomes focusing on non-technical skills. In healthcare, 
there has been an under-investment of time and resources 
in human factors in a wider sense, and non-technical 
skills specifically, despite it being shown to be relevant in 
other high-risk industries and to have delivered extremely 
significant reductions of accidents.
This theoretical paper supports the adoption of a broader 
model of human performance as a function of technical and 
non-technical skills, and the cultural and organisational 
context where these are at play. We also aim to highlight a 
pathway to increase the investment in non-technical skills 
following the most updated evidence.
Focus on outcomes
The focus on outcome is not new to our profession; all 
national and international databases support the trend 
that moves the major outcomes towards improvement. 
We have progressively reduced mortality (2,3), through 
the comparison of surgical techniques, identification of 
the technique with best outcomes (low mortality, low 
morbidity, best long-term survival), implementation of the 
best techniques and consequent reduction of variability. 
Databases sponsored by national societies offer reassurance 
to patients and governing bodies that individual surgeons 
perform within an acceptable range. Low-performing 
surgeons are investigated and supported to bring outcomes 
within the accepted range. However, it is recognised that 
these are lagging indicators, to use a term from the safety 
world, and that we should be looking to develop leading 
indicators or practices if we truly want to improve patient 
safety.
Technology has helped in the standardisation of surgical 
practices. For example, the use of staplers has reduced 
the variability of outcomes associated with surgical skills 
in a number of steps. During a lobectomy procedure, the 
quality of closure of bronchi, veins and arteries and the 
completion of fissures has been standardised, and results 
have become consistently more reproducible independent 
of surgical skills.
Models of performance
We use models of the world to make sense of what is 
happening around us and to predict what is going to happen 
next. In the healthcare context, like in many other domains, 
we accept that observed outcomes in a socio-technical 
environment are a function of human behaviours.
OBSERVED OUTCOMES = f (BEHAVIOURS)
Kurt Lewin, a social psychologist in 1936, for the first 
time, defined human behaviours with this formula.
BEHAVIOURS = f (P,E)
Where P stands for the entirety of a person (e.g., his or 
her past, present, future, personality, motivations, desires, 
knowledge, skills) and E represents the physical and cultural 
environment in which they are operating.
Combining these two formulae, we can accept that 
observed outcomes are a function of the persona of the 
individual involved in the task, and of the environment in 
which the action takes place.
OBSERVED OUTCOMES = f (P,E)
W h e n  w e  a n a l y s e  h u m a n  p e r f o r m a n c e  w h i l e 
accomplishing a task, what we see is the expression of the 
persona through his or her skills.
OBSERVED OUTCOMES = f (SKILLS, E)
The Oxford Dictionary defines skill as the ability to do 
something well. In other words, it is an expression of the 
individual or team that achieves a pre-defined or expected 
outcome.
As highlighted by Lewin, skillful actions do not 
happen in a vacuum but in a pre-defined environment. 
The technical, operational and cultural environments in 
which the surgical team is operating will have an impact 
on outcomes. Such influencers of performance could be 
surgical instrument design, shift patterns, operating theatre 
layout, safety culture within the organisation or national 
culture. The importance of the environment/context is 
highlighted, for example, in the WITH model (see Figure 1) 
from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). 
This model emphasises error-producing conditions within 
an operational environment and covers work environment, 
individual capabilities, task/demands and human nature 
(4,5). These all come under the wider umbrella of human 
factors, system design and system interaction, and are 
outside the scope of this paper. Focusing on technical and 
non-technical skills development without addressing these 
other factors in a meaningful way will have a limited impact 
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on patient safety and patient outcomes.
For simplicity, we will refer to these aspects as context 
rather than “E” (Environment) (6).
OBSERVED OUTCOMES = f (SKILLS, CONTEXT)
Within the context factor, we can include physical 
resources needed to perform the procedure, staffing, 
organisational guidelines, etc.
In the surgical community, surgeons undertake 
significant training and development over a long period 
to enable technical skills. The focus on technical aspects 
during training induces the subconscious acceptance of 
a simplified model of surgical performance where only a 
subset of skills (the technical one) seems to have relevance 
in determining outcomes.
OBSERVED OUTCOMES = f  (TECHNICAL 
SKILLS, CONTEXT)
Once surgeons and healthcare providers have accepted 
this model, it is only natural to invest time and resources 
to improve outcomes by refining the surgical technical 
skills, by improving the supporting technology and 
the environment in which the surgical procedures are 
performed.
The pervasiveness of this simplistic model is also 
reflected in the training curricula for aspiring thoracic 
surgeons in most countries (7), which focus attention almost 
exclusively on developing technical knowledge and skills.
Distractions/lnterruptions
Changes/departure from routine
Confusing displays/controls
Workarounds/out of service 
instrumentation
Hidden system response
Unexpected equipment conditions
Work environment Individual
Task related
Unintentional 
outcomes
Expected
outcome
Unfamiliar with task/first time
Lack of knowledge (faulty mental 
model)
New technique not used before
Imprecise communication habits
Lack of proficiency/inexperience
Human nature
Stress (limits attention）
Habit patterns
Assumptions (Inaccurate mental picture)
Complacency/overconfidence
Mind-set
Inaccurate risk perception (pollyanna)
Time pressure
High workload
Simultaneous, multiple tasks
Repetitive actions/monotony
Irreversible acts
Interpretation of requirements
Figure 1 The WITH model. Error precursors that are present in the work environment, in the individuals, in the task at hands and in the 
human nature pull the performance away from expected outcomes towards unintentional outcomes (errors).
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Creating more accurate models
As models are approximations of reality, the more 
accurate we can make them, the more relevant they are 
to the problems we are trying to solve. The model f 
(TECHNICAL SKILLS, CONTEXT) omits a number 
of variables that affect outcomes. Informal conversations 
among surgeons have identified that, frequently, the concept 
of luck has been left out of the equation when it comes 
to outcomes—especially as it could swing the difference 
between a good outcome and a bad one, once surgical skills 
have been fully developed. Ironically, this is counter to the 
reductionist view of controlling all the variables within the 
system by reducing complex tasks to individual steps and 
associated checks.
OBSERVED OUTCOMES = f  (TECHNICAL 
SKILLS, CONTEXT, LUCK)
Luck is a signpost for variability of performance, 
uncertainty and the possibility of “black swans”. Some 
aspects of luck will be explored in the following paragraphs.
Black swans have been defined as events that come as a 
surprise, have a major effect and are often inappropriately 
rationalised after the fact with the benefit of hindsight (8). 
In the surgical domain, this could be a massive pulmonary 
embolism and consequent death of a patient on day two 
after a successful lobectomy.
Note that variability of performance should not 
be included under the label of luck, although this is 
psychologically more acceptable. Variability of performance 
is an aspect of technical skills and can be addressed through 
training and deliberate practice (9).
We can assume that luck is at play when:
 A chance occurrence affects a person or group (e.g., 
a patient or a surgical team);
 The chance occurrence causes a good or bad 
outcome;
 It is reasonable to assume that another outcome was 
possible (10).
For example, a patient has an anaphylactic reaction 
to an antibiotic in theatre, is then treated according to 
the most updated guidelines, but dies. This is an unlucky 
event because it fulfils the above criteria: it was a chance 
occurrence, it caused a bad outcome and it was reasonable 
to assume that a good outcome was possible. For the patient 
and surgical team involved in this event, we can consider it 
unlucky.
Luck can also play a part in positive outcomes. There are 
situations where bad things happen and the overall outcome 
is good out of sheer luck. During mortality and morbidity 
audits, when investigating good outcomes after bad events, 
it is worth adding the question “what worked well and 
were we lucky or good?” to the proceedings. Good, in this 
context, would be the result of a system that is able to fail 
safely because those within it had predicted the possibility 
of failure, and barriers were in place to reduce the impact of 
the event (6).
Randomness and luck are related. It is useful to think 
that randomness operates at the level of the system, while 
luck operates at the level of the individual.
Looking at anaphylaxis it occurs in approximately 4 
out of 100,000 administrations of antibiotics (11). An 
effect of randomness is the order in which patients present 
anaphylaxis, as we do not know for certain which four 
patients from the 100,000, will manifest it. Patients are 
blinded to their own susceptibility to anaphylaxis, unless it 
has occurred to them before, and so at an individual level 
this could be thought of as unlucky.
In the formula we are developing, at a system level, if we 
assume that resources available are constant, luck can be 
expressed by randomness. This assumption is interesting, 
given that healthcare is resource-limited.
OBSERVED OUTCOMES = f  (TECHNICAL 
SKILLS, CONTEXT, RANDOMNESS)
There are negative events that are not explained by this 
model. Surgical teams with high levels of technical skills are 
occasionally able to produce extremely negative outcomes. 
A famous case in the UK was the removal of the wrong 
kidney (12), but similar events continued to happen as 
shown in a report commissioned by NHS Improvement (13). 
In these situations, similar to other high-risk industries, the 
adverse outcomes seem to be related to the lack of effective 
non-technical skills. The list of investigations supporting 
the importance of non-technical skills in the causation and 
avoidance of accidents is constantly increasing (14,15). This 
leads to the next version of the formula.
OBSERVED OUTCOMES = f  (TECHNICAL 
SKILLS ,  CONTEXT,  RANDOMNESS,  NON-
TECHNICAL SKILLS)
Definition of technical and non-technical skills
As seen before, a skill has been defined as the ability to do 
something well. The adjective ‘technical’ means having 
special and usually practical knowledge, especially of a 
mechanical or scientific subject. In relation to surgery, 
the best way of identifying what technical skills are is to 
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start with a list: suturing, dissecting, reviewing scans and 
identifying anatomical structures are all technical skills. 
Improvement in the technical aspects of the surgeon’s job 
can be supported by the application of deliberate practice (9) 
and the development of direct technology (e.g., staplers, 
robots, etc.) and supporting technologies e.g., anaesthesia, 
drugs and camera systems.
What falls under the non-technical skills for surgeons 
has been organised in a taxonomy by Yule et al. (16) and 
is summarised in a publication of the Royal College of 
Surgeons (Edinburgh) Non-Technical Skills for Surgeons 
(NOTSS) Handbook Vol. 1.2. (17).
This publication identifies the following non-technical 
skills:
 Situation awareness: the gathering and understanding 
of information, and the ability to project and 
anticipate future states.
 Decision-making: formulation of options, selection 
of the most favourable option, communication 
and implementation of the option and, ideally, the 
review.
 Communication and teamwork: the ability to 
exchange information and, based on it, the ability to 
establish a shared understanding of the situation at 
hand; the ability to coordinate and collaborate within 
and across teams.
 Leadership: the ability to set and maintain standards, 
support others, and cope with pressure.
Performance-shaping factors like stress and fatigue 
are not included in the NOTSS Handbook, but Flin 
et al. highlight their importance as they can impact the 
effectiveness of both technical and non-technical skills (18). 
Stress and fatigue reduce the likelihood that errors will be 
detected, trapped and mitigated and, therefore, could have 
a significant impact on outcomes. These performance-
shaping factors fit within the operational ‘context’.
OBSERVED OUTCOMES = f  (TECHNICAL 
SKILLS ,  CONTEXT,  RANDOMNESS,  NON-
TECHNICAL SKILLS, STRESS|FATIGUE)
The impact of technical skills on outcomes
During the last few decades, the continual improvements 
in technical skills and technological interventions within 
healthcare have led to progressive improvements in 
outcomes.
Although we have seen the progressive reduction of 
mortality in our specialty, we cannot avoid noticing that, 
within healthcare, there are still a number of patients dying 
unnecessarily. A paper published in 2016 in BMJ suggests 
that medical error is the third cause of death after heart 
disease and cancer. The study might be underreporting the 
number of deaths because of medical error. However, using 
the attribution ‘medical error’ does not necessarily improve 
learning, as it is a catch-all term that does not define how 
the error was propagated through the system, nor how it 
could have been prevented. Errors which lead to a fatality 
highlight the latent or potential lethality within the system 
and could be thought of as an outcome and not necessarily 
a cause of death. This might appear controversial, but any 
system which has a risk of death has a level of lethality 
within it, and it is only through humans creating safety that 
that lethality is kept at bay.
Error is a form of outcome. It is the unintentional 
deviation from an expected outcome. Conklin emphasises 
in his book that “these unintentional deviations are not 
detectable as deviations while the deviation is occurring” (6). 
Consequently, errors are not a choice, just one of the 
normal expected, although not desired, outcomes of the 
formula developed so far.
ERROR = f (TECHNICAL SKILLS, CONTEXT, 
RANDOMNESS, NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS)
When we look at errors as one of the possible outcomes, 
then the importance moves from avoiding errors to being 
“robust enough to recover effectively and gracefully” (6). 
Flight crews have formalised this process by moving beyond 
general non-technical skills to understanding what errors 
are likely to occur in the next activity e.g., taxi, take-off or 
approach and landing, and trapping or putting an activity 
in place to mitigate it. Crew recognise that errors cannot 
be removed from a system, but error-producing conditions 
are predictable. This process is known as “Threat and Error 
Management”.
When we look at death, we are only looking at the tip 
of an iceberg. Morbidity is significantly more common 
and, while the correlation between minor incidents, 
major incidents and fatalities in Heinrich/Bird’s triangle 
has been debunked, morbidity events provide significant 
opportunities for learning as ‘medical error’ will be present 
in these events too (19).
M O R B I D I T Y  =  f  ( T E C H N I C A L  S K I L L S , 
CONTEXT, RANDOMNESS, NON-TECHNICAL 
SKILLS)
The number of adverse events reported within the NHS 
is increasing every year, and the same effect is evident in all 
healthcare systems currently recording these events.
S1003Journal of Thoracic Disease, Vol 11, Suppl 7 April 2019
© Journal of Thoracic Disease. All rights reserved. J Thorac Dis 2019;11(Suppl 7):S998-S1008jtd.amegroups.com
The increasing number of reported events may be due to 
improving reporting. However modern healthcare systems 
are more complex and resources are reducing; therefore 
errors may be more likely. It is more plausible that it is 
combination of both theories.
To counter this rise, governing and regulatory bodies are 
investing in programmes to reduce the number of adverse 
outcomes through the use of evidence-based medicine 
and practice. This has led to standardised and optimised 
techniques which are widely deployed and available to the 
patient population (minimally invasive colorectal resections 
experienced in UK). However, such evidence-based practice 
is limited when it comes to non-technical skills.
Improving outcomes: return on investment and 
law of diminishing returns
When we attempt to improve performance, the relationship 
between investment of resources and performance tends to 
be linear when the performance is really poor (see Figure 2). 
A small investment at this stage increases performance. 
Progressive investments increase performance in a linear 
way until an inflection point is reached. Prior to this 
point, the investment is productive. After the inflection 
point, we see a diminishing return and the curve becomes 
progressively flatter until it reaches a plateau. If we 
continue investing, it is likely that we will reach a point 
of diminishing returns. Performance will not increase 
with further investment and will very likely progressively 
decrease.
It is the opinion of the authors that the investment on 
the technical side i.e. technical skills development and 
technological solutions, has passed the point of inflection 
and entered the diminishing return phase. Looking at 
this through a different lens—that of human factors and 
non-technical skills—because of the lack of attention 
and, subsequently, the associated lack of investment, non-
technical skills are still in the productive investment phase.
Improving outcomes: the importance of zero in 
multiplicative system
The formula we have slowly developed recognises a number 
of factors that have an effect on the outcomes. The factors 
within brackets are separated by a comma. This use of 
commas is intentional.
OBSERVED OUTCOMES = f  (TECHNICAL 
SKILLS ,  CONTEXT,  RANDOMNESS,  NON-
TECHNICAL SKILLS, STRESS|FATIGUE)
If the effect of the different factors is addictive 
(represented in the following formula by the sign “+”), then 
it is possible to deliver positive outcomes even if one of the 
factors is equal to zero.
OBSERVED OUTCOMES = f (TECHNICAL SKILLS 
+ CONTEXT + RANDOMNESS + NON-TECHNICAL 
SKILLS + STRESS|FATIGUE)
This additive process introduces a bias as it may lead us 
to think that ‘non-technical skills’, ‘context’ and the impact 
of ‘stress/fatigue’ could be added, or not, to technical 
skills and still have a positive outcome. If the coefficient is 
between zero and one, the effect will be reductive and not 
positive. Consequently, we need to recognise that there are 
situations where ‘non-technical skills’ and ‘context’ could 
have a multiplicative effect.
Inflection
point
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
Energy/time/resources invested
Negative returnsDiminishing returns
Technical skillsNON Technical skills
Productive investment
Figure 2 The law of diminishing return applied to technical and non-technical skills.
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OBSERVED OUTCOMES = f (TECHNICAL SKILLS 
× CONTEXT × RANDOMNESS × NON-TECHNICAL 
SKILLS × STRESS|FATIGUE)
If this is the formula, then we can see that if non-
technical skills, context or stress/fatigue equal zero, then 
these factors are able to cancel the effect of all the other 
factors.
Ineffective situational awareness (non-technical skill 
coefficient = zero), for example, may allow the perfect 
execution of a surgical procedure on the wrong side (wrong 
kidney removed) and nullify the positive impact of all the 
technical skills and context. The same applies for context 
when time pressures, fatigue, operating room design and a 
lack of just culture impact human performance, leading to a 
suboptimal outcome. While teams may have great technical 
skills and effective non-technical skills, the positive 
outcomes can easily be destroyed if stress/fatigue and the 
context (organisational level) are not managed effectively.
As we can see, a lack of technical skills also has a 
multiplicative effect and creates unwanted outcomes. 
However, this occurrence is significantly less likely because 
of the way in which the training and accreditation of 
surgeons is designed. It is very unlikely for a surgeon 
to finish training, gain accreditation and be allowed to 
practice in the absence of technical skills (technical skills 
coefficient = zero).
Focus on non-technical skills in high-risk 
industries and outcomes
The importance of non-technical skills was originally 
noticed in the ‘70s and ‘80s. Investigations conducted 
to understand the reason behind catastrophic events in 
high-risk industries like nuclear and aviation showed 
that there was no lack of technical skills, but a failure in 
communication, situation awareness, decision-making and 
teamwork. Among those events were the Tenerife crash 
of two Jumbo Jets on the runway in 1997, the Chernobyl 
nuclear accident in 1986 and the Piper Alpha oil platform in 
1988. While aviation started formal programmes for crew 
resource management (CRM) in the 1990s, it wasn’t until 
after the Macondo disaster (Deep Water Horizon) that 
the Institute of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) published 
Documents 501, 502 and 503 (20) which detailed Well 
Operations, CRM procedures and training for Oil and Gas 
workers.
Among the high-risk industries, aviation has achieved 
dramatic improvement of its safety profile. One of the 
reasons for this is the training of pilots and crew members in 
CRM. The benefits of CRM are seen in normal operations 
to prevent error, but they have significant benefits when 
in uncertain, complex and ambiguous situations, because 
it allows a shared mental model to be created within the 
operational team. Furthermore, CRM:
 Is a set of planning and operational procedures for 
use in environments where human errors can have 
devastating effects;
 Is used primarily for improving performance, leading 
to increased safety;
 Focuses on interpersonal communication, leadership 
and decision-making.
However, CRM is part of the wider human factors 
domain and all personnel working airside are mandated to 
have periodic human factors training to understand how 
human error is propagated through the system and what 
they can do to predict, trap and mitigate it.
Aviation, as an example of success, has reduced the 
number of accidents and become one of the safest industries. 
Still, it is difficult to demonstrate the link between CRM 
training and outcomes (21).
It should be noted that transferring CRM from one 
domain or culture to another has limitations. For example, 
when CRM programmes from the US were taken to the Far 
East, they were not as effective because of national cultures 
impacting individual and team performance (22).
Focus on non-technical skills in healthcare and 
outcomes
Despite numerous case studies, accident reports and 
research papers showing the benefit of the application of 
human factors and non-technical skills programmes, no 
coherent programme for the application of non-technical 
skills has been developed and deployed within the NHS. 
This is despite the constant pillars of CRM—situation 
awareness, decision-making, communication and teamwork 
and leadership—that have been adopted in healthcare.
For non-technical skills programmes to be effective, they 
need to be part of colleges’ training programmes, achieve 
a critical mass within the operational environment and 
require the leadership from government to healthcare units 
to be proactive in their support and development.
When we look at the currently published literature 
regarding the link between patient outcomes and non-
technical skills, we can group the measured outcomes in 
four domains:
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 Efficiency of patients’ care (time to perform);
 Complications;
 Length of stay;
 Survival/mortality.
A small number of studies (23,24) shows that CRM 
training improves efficiency of patient care but has no effect 
on mortality or other clinical outcomes. Two other studies 
(25,26) show that adopting HF/CRM programmes can have 
a positive effect on patient safety and financial resources. 
Both papers underline the need for an upfront investment of 
time and financial resources. One study (27) shows that, after 
CRM training, the mortality for paediatric cardiac arrest 
dropped and the survival improved from 33% to 50%.
Other authors (28) published an improvement of 37% 
in perinatal outcomes after non-technical skills simulation 
training.
A meta-analysis that looks at NTS in surgical teams, 
published in 2018 (29), shows that there are a small number 
of heterogeneous and mostly underpowered studies that 
look at the relationship between patient outcomes and 
NTS training. This analysis failed to identify a strong 
improvement in patient outcomes after NTS training, 
although the NTS skills of the team trained were 
improving. The authors suggest that improvement in 
patient outcomes could be demonstrated in well-conducted, 
appropriately powered prospective trials.
Other supporting evidence to NTS comes from the 4th 
National Audit Projects (14,15). This investigates major 
airways complications in the UK and confirms that human 
factors have played a significant role. More specifically, 
latent threats are predisposed to loss of situational awareness 
and poor decision-making (30).
One of the problems with delivering change regarding 
human behaviour and organisational performance is the 
need to make large investments in time and resources, and 
this might be why there is a lack of published literature 
showing how CRM or NTS improvement programmes can 
positively impact patient outcomes. Two research projects, 
one from Moffatt-Bruce et al., and another from Haerkens 
et al., have shown that, with such investment, significant 
benefits can be realised. Haerkens et al. showed that the 
standardised mortality ratio decreased from 0.72 in the 
baseline year to 0.60 in the post-implementation year, with 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation success rate increased from 
19% to 55% and 67%. Moffat-Bruce et al. showed that 
the total number of adverse events avoided was reduced by 
25.7%. The savings ranged from a conservative estimate of 
$12.6 million to as much as $28.0 million with an overall 
ROI for CRM training in the range of $9.1–24.4 million.
Morally, patient outcomes are important. However, most 
healthcare systems are run as businesses and, therefore, 
financial and resource outcomes also need to be addressed 
if a paradigm shift regarding adoption is to occur. Kuhn’s 
paradigm shift model (31) highlights that, until a model 
crisis is reached where the current paradigm is unable 
to match the reality of the problems faced, the current 
paradigm will be maintained. It is not clear what that crisis 
will be for healthcare to adopt human factors and non-
technical skills in a more coherent manner, but limited 
financial resources and public outcry might be the trigger.
Developing non-technical skills
The way which we develop surgical skills is very different 
from the way in which we develop non-technical skills. 
When we look at an individual who is starting surgical 
training, he/she usually has no surgical skills prior to 
college, although they may have developed skills that can 
be the foundation of his/her surgical career. For example, 
a person who has spent time improving his/her fine motor 
skills will be at an advantage during surgical training. Most 
people will have an acceptable baseline of these skills that 
they have acquired during the previous years of their life, 
investing time in playing, practicing hobbies and engaging 
in normal daily activities.
Individuals starting surgical training will also have 
developed a degree of non-technical skills that have allowed 
them to survive normal daily tasks, school, university and 
they will be practiced at different levels of competence.
By examining the skillsets of those who enter surgical 
training programmes, we can see that the range of 
competencies in the non-technical area is much broader 
than in the technical. For this reason, non-technical skills 
are one of the major sources of variation in outcomes.
The lack of focus on non-technical skills during surgical 
training allows aspiring surgeons to end their surgical 
training without any real improvement of their non-
technical skills. The training in technical skills moves the 
aspiring surgeons up towards proficiency; however, there is 
no similar transformation regarding non-technical skills.
The causal link between non-technical skills training 
and improvement of outcomes is difficult to demonstrate. 
Attempts in healthcare have shown differing degrees of 
success for a variety of reasons, not least the high number 
of confounding variables involved. Interestingly, this causal 
link has been hard to prove in aviation, where improvement 
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in safety has been attributed to non-technical skills and 
human factors/ergonomics (21,22).
How to ensure that training drives changes in 
the workplace
Wood et al. (32) recommend the use of NOTSS as the gold 
standard for training individuals. They also recommend 
Oxford NOTECHS II as a training tool in non-technical 
skills for teams.
One of the main limits of non-technical skills training 
in healthcare is that the majority of resources are used 
in the delivery development of the training and very 
few are allocated to sustain behaviour in the workplace. 
A study by Brinkeroff in the workplace suggests that if 
enough resources are invested to support new behaviour 
in the workplace after training, the chances of sustaining 
this behaviour are in the range of 80%, while, if few or 
no resources are invested, the chances of sustaining new 
behaviour are as low as 15%.
How do we know when the training we have delivered 
is effective? Kirkpatrick developed a model identifying four 
levels at which we can evaluate training programmes. The 
first is the reaction of the participants to the training; they 
answer the question, “Did they like it?” The second answers 
the question, “Did I learn something?” The third assesses 
if there have been changes in behaviour when the trainees 
return to the workplace. The fourth is the most important, 
and assesses if the training delivers the final results that the 
organisation was looking for.
If a healthcare professional was attending non-technical 
skills training, he/she would say:
 Level I: “I like the training and I found it engaging”;
 Level II: “I’ve learnt something”. This statement 
could be objectively assessed to ensure that the 
learning has taken place, using a validated scoring 
system like NOTSS;
 Level III: “I routinely use what I have learned during 
the non-technical skills training in my day-to-day 
job”. Objective assessment of new behaviours could 
be performed in the workplace during audits. For 
example, consistent use of checklists and closed-loop 
communication;
 The organisation or sponsoring professional body 
should be able to assess level IV;
 Level IV: the hospital should be able to see a 
reduction in adverse events for the teams who have 
attended training.
A study (33) looked at the transfer of learning from 
“classroom” to workplace using the above classification. 
The authors identified nine studies in total. Out of these, 
four studies measured the transfer of simulation-based 
CRM learning into the clinical setting (Kirkpatrick level 3) 
and highlighted that adding simulation was more effective 
than didactic teaching. Five studies tried to look at patient 
outcomes (Kirkpatrick level 4). Only one found that 
simulation-based CRM training had a clearly significant 
impact on patient mortality (27).
Conclusions
Both positive and negative outcomes are multifactorial and 
can be summarised by the following formula.
OBSERVED OUTCOMES = f  (TECHNICAL 
SKILLS ,  CONTEXT,  RANDOMNESS,  NON-
TECHNICAL SKILLS)
A mnemonic aid for thoracic surgeons is “ThoRaCotomy 
or Not”.
OBSERVED OUTCOMES = f (ThoRaCotomy or Not)
T = technical skills;
R = randomness;
C = context;
Not = non-technical skills.
In healthcare, outcomes are frequently analysed in 
a reductionistic way, focusing on the technical aspects 
(performed procedure, administered drug, etc.) and 
patients’ physical characteristics. The lack of focus on non-
technical skills, context and effect of randomness blinds us 
to a significant portion of possible causal explanations. In 
other high-risk industries, the exploration of these areas has 
delivered a significant improvement in performance. The 
evidence in healthcare is still lacking and is mainly limited 
to the report of investigations that have identified the lack 
of non-technical skills as likely precursors of severe adverse 
events limited to small heterogeneous studies.
The above formula and mnemonic might help surgeons 
when analysing outcomes to avoid the immediate tunnel 
vision effects of focusing on technical skills.
The identification of error precursors is important. Using 
tools similar to the WITH model from the nuclear domain, 
or the threat and error management process in aviation, 
will help thoracic surgeons and associated surgical teams 
to identify situations where there is a higher risk of error 
and reduce the risk of failing. In aviation, technical skills 
are taken for granted because of the ongoing professional 
competency assessments. Consequently, it is when 
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randomness and context start to significantly shape the 
activity, that effective non-technical skills come into their 
own regarding outcomes, and can add a large multiplicative 
factor to the function if they are well developed.
A cultural change (see Figure 3) associated with effective 
training, if incorporated in properly designed studies, will 
offer the evidence to support the investment of resources. 
However, training delivery is not a simple process and can 
be likened to situational leadership. One size does not fit 
all, despite this being the wishes of organisation, who would 
like to have simple repeatability.
One of the ways we have to improve performance 
is to reduce variability and, ideally, move the average 
performance towards higher standards. However, the 
improvement in standards should not just be limited to 
technical skills where tangible improvements are more easily 
identified, but also in non-technical skills and improving the 
operational context, such as culture and system design. It is 
believed that improvements in this area will have significant 
multiplicative coefficients when it comes to outcomes.
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